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Abstract: Peer to peer (P2P) e-commerce applications exist at the edge of the Internet with vulnerabilities 
to passive and active attacks. These attacks have pushed away potential business firms and individuals 
whose aim is to get the best benefit in e-commerce with minimal losses. The attacks occur during 
interactions between the trading peers as a transaction takes place. Sybil attack is addressed as an active 
attack, in which peers can have bogus and multiple identities to fake their own. Most existing work, which 
concentrates on social networks and trusted certification, has not been able to prevent Sybil attack peers 
from doing transactions. Neighbor similarity trust relationship is used to address Sybil attack. Duplicated 
Sybil attack peers can be identified as the neighbor peers become acquainted and hence more trusted to 
each other.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
P2P networks range from communication systems 
like email and instant messaging to collaborative 
content rating, recommendation, and delivery 
systems such as YouTube, Gnutela, Facebook, 
Digg, and BitTorrent. They allow any user to join 
the system easily at the expense of trust, with very 
little validation control. P2P overlay networks are 
known for their many desired attributes like 
openness, anonymity, decentralized nature, self-
organization, scalability, and fault tolerance. Each 
peer plays the dual role of client as well as server, 
meaning that each has its own control. All the 
resources utilized in the P2P infrastructure are 
contributed by the peers themselves unlike 
traditional methods where a central authority 
control is used. 
II. RELATED PROBLEM 
Peers can collude and do all sorts of malicious 
activities in the open-access distributed systems. 
These malicious behaviors lead to service quality 
degradation and monetary loss among business 
partners. Peers are vulnerable to exploitation, due 
to the open and near-zero cost of creating new 
identities. The peer identities are then utilized to 
influence the behavior of the system. However, if a 
single defective entity can present multiple 
identities, it can control a substantial fraction of the 
system, thereby undermining the redundancy. The 
number of identities that an attacker can generate 
depends on the attacker’s resources such as 
bandwidth, memory, and computational power. 
The goal of trust systems is to ensure that honest 
peers are accurately identified as trustworthy and 
Sybil peers as untrustworthy. 
Defending against Sybil attack is quite a 
challenging task. A peer can pretend to be trusted 
with a hidden motive. The peer can pollute the 
system with bogus information, which interferes 
with genuine business transactions and functioning 
of the systems. This must be counter prevented to 
protect the honest peers. The link between an 
honest peer and a Sybil peer is known as an attack 
edge. As each edge involved resembles a human-
established trust, it is difficult for the adversary to 
introduce an excessive number of attack edges.  
III. SYBIL ATTACK OVERVIEW 
A peer can give positive recommendation to a peer 
which is discovered is a Sybil or malicious peer. 
This can diminish the influence of Sybil identities 
hence reduce Sybil attack. A peer which has been 
giving dishonest recommendations will have its 
trust level reduced. In case it reaches a certain 
threshold level, the peer can be expelled from the 
group. Each peer has an identity, which is either 
honest or Sybil.  
A Sybil identity can be an identity owned by a 
malicious user, or it can be a bribed/stolen identity, 
or it can be a fake identity obtained through a Sybil 
attack [24]. These Sybil attack peers are employed 
to target honest peers and hence subvert the system. 
In Sybil attack, a single malicious user creates a 
large number of peer identities called sybils. These 
sybils are used to launch security attacks, both at 
the application level and at the overlay level. At the 
application level, sybils can target other honest 
peers while transacting with them, whereas at the 
overlay level, sybils can disrupt the services 
offered by the overlay layer like routing, data 
storage, lookup, etc. In trust systems, colluding 
Sybil peers may artificially increase a (malicious) 
peer’s rating (e.g., eBay). Systems like Credence 
rely on a trusted central authority to prevent 
maliciousness.  
The only known promising defense against Sybil 
attack is to use social networks to perform user 
admission control and limit the number of bogus 
identities admitted to a system.  Authentication-
based mechanisms are used to verify the identities 
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of the peers using shared encryption keys, or 
location information. 
Social network is used to eliminate Sybil attack, 
and the findings are based on preventing Sybil 
identities.  
IV. PROBLEM ANALYSIS 
Neighbor similarity trust is used in a group P2P 
ecommerce based on interest relationships, to 
eliminate maliciousness among the peers. This is 
refereed to as SybilTrust.  In SybilTrust, the 
interest based group infrastructure peers have a 
neighbor similarity trust between each other, hence 
they are able to prevent Sybil attack.  
SybilTrust gives a better relationship in e-
commerce transactions as the peers create a link 
between peer neighbors.  
Peers use self-certifying identifiers that are 
exchanged when they initially come into contact. 
These can be used as public keys to verify digital 
signatures on the messages sent by their neighbors.  
More honest peers are admitted compared to 
malicious peers, where the trust association is 
aimed at positive results.  
Distributed admission control is used which only 
requires each peer to be initially aware of only its 
immediate trusted neighbors, and to look for honest 
neighbors. The neighbors assist to locate other 
peers of same interest in other levels. 
SybilTrust that can identify and protect honest 
peers from Sybil attack. The Sybil peers can have 
their trust canceled and dismissed from a group. 
Based on the group infrastructure in P2P e-
commerce, each neighbor is connected to the peers 
by the success of the transactions it makes or the 
trust evaluation level.  A peer can only be 
recognized as a neighbor depending on whether or 
not trust level is sustained over a threshold value. 
SybilTrust enables neighbor peers to carry 
recommendation identifiers among the peers in a 
group. Group detection algorithms to identify Sybil 
attack peers to be efficient and scalable in large 
P2P e-commerce networks. 
V. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 
 
VI. LITERATURE SUMMARY 
Experience with an object reputation system for 
peer to peer filesharing 
Credence, a decentralized object reputation and 
ranking system for large-scale peer-to-peer 
filesharing networks. Credence counteracts 
pollution in these networks by allowing honest 
peers to assess the authenticity of online content 
through secure tabulation and management of 
endorsements from other peers. Our system enables 
peers to learn relationships even in the absence of 
direct observations or interactions through a novel, 
flow-based trust computation to discover 
trustworthy peers. We have deployed Credence as 
an overlay on top of the Gnutella filesharing 
network, with more than 10,000 downloads of our 
client software to date. We describe the system 
design, our experience with its deployment, and 
results from a long-term study of the trust network 
built by users. Data from the live deployment 
shows that Credence's flow-based trust 
computation enables users to avoid undesirable 
content. Honest Credence clients can identify three 
quarters of the decoys encountered when querying 
the Gnutella network. 
Footprint: Detecting Sybil attacks in urban 
vehicular networks 
In urban vehicular networks, where privacy, 
especially the location privacy of anonymous 
vehicles is highly concerned, anonymous 
verification of vehicles is indispensable. 
Consequently, an attacker who succeeds in forging 
multiple hostile identifies can easily launch a Sybil 
attack, gaining a disproportionately large influence. 
In this paper, we propose a novel Sybil attack 
detection mechanism, Footprint, using the 
trajectories of vehicles for identification while still 
preserving their location privacy. More 
specifically, when a vehicle approaches a road-side 
unit (RSU), it actively demands an authorized 
message from the RSU as the proof of the 
appearance time at this RSU. We design a location-
hidden authorized message generation scheme for 
two objectives: first, RSU signatures on messages 
are signer ambiguous so that the RSU location 
information is concealed from the resulted 
authorized message; second, two authorized 
messages signed by the same RSU within the same 
given period of time (temporarily linkable) are 
recognizable so that they can be used for 
identification. With the temporal limitation on the 
linkability of two authorized messages, authorized 
messages used for long-term identification are 
prohibited. With this scheme, vehicles can generate 
a location-hidden trajectory for location-privacy-
preserved identification by collecting a consecutive 
series of authorized messages. Utilizing social 
relationship among trajectories according to the 
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similarity definition of two trajectories, Footprint 
can recognize and therefore dismiss “communities” 
of Sybil trajectories. Rigorous security analysis and 
extensive trace-driven simulations demonstrate the 
efficacy of Footprint. 
Detecting Sybil attacks in VANETs 
Sybil attacks have been regarded as a serious 
security threat to Ad hoc Networks and Sensor 
Networks. They may also impair the potential 
applications in Vehicular Ad hoc Networks 
(VANETs) by creating an illusion of traffic 
congestion. In this paper, we make various attempts 
to explore the feasibility of detecting Sybil attacks 
by analyzing signal strength distribution. First, we 
propose a cooperative method to verify the 
positions of potential Sybil nodes. We use a 
Random Sample Consensus (RANSAC)-based 
algorithm to make this cooperative method more 
robust against outlier data fabricated by Sybil 
nodes. However, several inherent drawbacks of this 
cooperative method prompt us to explore additional 
approaches. We introduce a statistical method and 
design a system which is able to verify where a 
vehicle comes from. The system is termed the 
Presence Evidence System (PES). With PES, we 
are able to enhance the detection accuracy using 
statistical analysis over an observation period. 
Finally, based on realistic US maps and traffic 
models, we conducted simulations to evaluate the 
feasibility and efficiency of our methods. Our 
scheme proves to be an economical approach to 
suppressing Sybil attacks without extra support 
from specific positioning hardware. 
Optimal Sybil-resilient peer admission control 
Peer-to-peer and other decentralized, distributed 
systems are known to be particularly vulnerable to 
Sybil attacks. In a Sybil attack, a malicious user 
obtains multiple fake identities and pretends to be 
multiple, distinct nodes in the system. By 
controlling a large fraction of the nodes in the 
system, the malicious user is able to ―out vote the 
honest users in collaborative tasks such as 
Byzantine failure defenses. This paper presents 
Sybil Guard, a novel protocol for limiting the 
corruptive influences of Sybil attacks. Our protocol 
is based on the ―social network among user 
identities, where an edge between two identities 
indicates a human-established trust relationship. 
Malicious users can create many identities but few 
trust relationships. Thus, there is a 
disproportionately-small ―cut in the graph 
between the Sybil nodes and the honest nodes. 
Sybil Guard exploits this property to bound the 
number of identities a malicious user can create. 
We show the effectiveness of Sybil Guard both 
analytically and experimentally.  
VII. IMPLEMENTATION 
Peer registration 
Peer register with a location details. Each peer in a 
P2P network is given a unique identity. The link 
between an honest peer and a Sybil peer is known 
as an attack edge. As each edge involved resembles 
a human-established trust, it is difficult for the 
adversary to introduce an excessive number of 
attack edges. The use of social networks between 
two peers represents real-world trust relationship 
between users. 
Find neighbor peer 
Each peer can identify its neighbors based on peer 
location. We assume location to be split into 
groups, for example, 100, 200 etc are assigned as 
peer location. peer which is between 0 to 100 
comes as its neighbor peers and peer between 101 
to 200 becomes the next group to cooperate.  
Assign trust to neighbor 
Each peer in a group can assign trust value to its 
neighbor peer in a group. Trust value like 0 or 1, 
which represents normal peer or attack peer. The 
neighborhood of a peer v in a P2P e-commerce is 
N(v)={z/(v,z)ЄE}.  Each peer v maintains a set of 
identifiers of its neighbors N(v); in which each one 
is unique. 
Sybil attacker 
Sybil attack, a malicious peer must try to present 
multiple distinct identities. This can be achieved by 
either generating legal identities or by 
impersonating other normal peers. Some peers may 
launch arbitrary attacks to interfere with P2P e-
commerce operations, or the normal functioning of 
the network. 
Sybil attack identification 
If the peer trades with very few unsuccessful 
transactions, we can deduce the peer is a Sybil 
peer. A peer u and a Sybil peer v can trade whether 
one is Sybil or not. Being in a group, comparison 
can be done to determine the number of peers 
which trade with peer. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
SybilTrust, a defense against Sybil attack in P2P e-
commerce is proposed. Compared to other 
approaches, this approach is based on 
neighborhood similarity trust in a group P2P e-
commerce community. This approach exploits the 
relationship between peers in a neighborhood 
setting. The results on real-world P2P e-commerce 
confirmed fastmixing property, hence validated the 
fundamental assumption behind SybilGuard’s 
approach. Also describe defense types such as key 
validation, distribution, and position verification. 
This methods can be done at in simultaneously 
with neighbor similarity trust which gives better 
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defense mechanism. For the future work, intend to 
implement SybilTrust within the context of peers 
which exist in many groups. Neighbor similarity 
trust helps to weed out the Sybil peers and isolate 
maliciousness to specific Sybil peer groups rather 
than allow attack in honest groups with all honest 
peers. 
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